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INTRODUCTION 
 After the IRS said Scott Alan Rasmussen owed more taxes than he 
expected three years in a row, Rasmussen decided to study the tax code to 
determine for himself how much he should be paying in taxes. After months 
of studying IRS publications and other materials, Rasmussen decided that he 
did not have to pay any taxes. He decided that his employment wages were 
not income, that only businesses were required to pay income tax, and that 
he therefore had no duty to file income tax returns or pay taxes.  
 The Utah State Tax Commission disagreed. Through twenty-three 
various notices, it informed Rasmussen that he was required to file a tax 
–2– 
return and pay state income taxes. But Rasmussen dug in and insisted that he 
was not required to pay taxes or file a tax return.  
 At his trial for tax evasion and failure to file tax returns over a six-year 
period, Rasmussen requested an instruction stating that a good-faith 
misunderstanding of the law was a complete defense even if that 
misunderstanding was unreasonable. The trial court denied the instruction 
because it believed the instruction went “too far”—a change in the relevant 
statute specified that two of the six charges Rasmussen faced for failure to file 
a tax return required a showing that Rasmussen act without a reasonable, 
good-faith basis. But the court invited Rasmussen to submit a revised 
instruction that would distinguish among counts. Rasmussen never did. 
 On appeal, Rasmussen repeats his argument that he was entitled to an 
instruction stating that any good-faith mistake of law need not be reasonable. 
But Rasmussen has not addressed, let alone challenged, the actual basis of the 
trial court’s ruling. This Court should thus decline to address Rasmussen’s 
claim on appeal. 
 It is unnecessary to reach the question of whether Rasmussen was 
entitled to the instruction he requested for a second reason: Any error in 
denying the instruction was harmless. First, the requested instruction would 
not have affected two of Rasmussen’s convictions, which by statute required 
–3– 
Rasmussen’ good-faith belief to be reasonable. Second, even if the jury had 
been instructed as requested, there is no reasonable likelihood that it would 
have found that Rasmussen actually believed in good faith that he was not 
required to pay taxes. The Tax Commission repeatedly notified him that his 
interpretation was wrong and that he did have to pay taxes. 
 Alternatively, the jury was adequately instructed. Even if Rasmussen 
were correct that in Utah an unreasonable but good-faith misunderstanding 
of the law could negate the required mental state for tax evasion and failure 
to file taxes, Rasmussen was not entitled to a separate instruction on the issue. 
The law in Utah is clear that a separate good-faith instruction is superfluous 
when the jury has been instructed on the required mental state. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it omitted a jury 
instruction that said a good-faith misunderstanding of the law need not be 
reasonable?  
 Standard of Review. Whether a trial court correctly denied a requested 
jury instruction is a question of law reviewed for correctness.  State v. Maestas, 
2012 UT 46, ¶148, 299 P.3d 892. However, courts “look at the jury instructions 
‘in their entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as a whole fairly 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.’” 
–4– 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of Relevant Facts 
 Scott Alan Rasmussen did not file a Utah tax return for tax years 2010 
through 2015, despite making an average of $46,000 each of those years. 
R444–45, 606–07. Rasmussen declared himself exempt from tax withholding 
and did not file tax returns because he decided that individuals are not 
required to pay income taxes—only businesses are. R583–84, 590, 592–94. 
Rasmussen maintained this stance despite the twenty-three notices he 
received from the Utah State Tax Commission informing him that he had to 
pay taxes. R473. 
Rasmussen takes issue with the income tax. 
 Rasmussen lived and worked in Washington as a manufacturing 
engineer, paying federal income taxes without issue for more than a decade. 
R577, 579. (Washington does not have a state income tax. R605.) But then the 
IRS informed Rasmussen three years in a row that he owed additional taxes. 
R581. The first year, Rasmussen “got mad and paid it.” R581. But when he 
continued to get notices that he owed more in taxes, Rasmussen “studied” 
his tax liability. R582. For “at least two months,” Rasmussen went to the 
library and “dug into” IRS materials and tax manuals. R582, 585. Rasmussen 
concluded that only businesses are required to pay taxes, and because he was 
–5– 
a common-law employee he should be exempt because his wages were not 
income. R586; SE14; SE16. According to Rasmussen, the only way an 
individual is required to file and pay taxes is if the individual files a tax 
return—the act of filing a tax return makes the individual a business. R583.  
 Based on his interpretation of tax law, Rasmussen changed his federal 
withholding status to exempt on his W-4 forms and stopped paying federal 
taxes. R446, 586–88, 603; DE1. Rasmussen moved to Utah but did not start 
filing state tax returns. R446, 580, 603–05.1  
The Tax Commission repeatedly informs Rasmussen of his tax liabilities. 
 When the Tax Commission receives wage information from an 
employer or receives other information indicating that a person may be 
required to file a tax return, but that person does not file a return, the Tax 
Commission sends the person a Request for Filing Information. R427–28. If 
the person does not adequately respond, the Tax Commission sends a Notice 
of Deficiency and Estimated Income Tax. R427–28. If the person does not pay 
the estimated amount or appeal the decision, the Tax Commission sends a 
Notice of Taxes Due and Intent to Lien. R429. If the person does not pay at 
                                              
1 Rasmussen’s employers generally did not withhold Utah income tax 
from his paychecks. SE1; SE3. Some was withheld between 2010 and 2013, 
but it was insufficient to cover Rasmussen’s full tax liability. SE2; SE21.  
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least a minimum amount toward the balance due, the Tax Commission 
records a tax lien against the person and sends a Notice of Lien and Intent to 
Offset, informing the person that a lien had been recorded and of the methods 
the Tax Commission intended to use to collect the tax. R429. 
 In April 2013, the Tax Commission sent Rasmussen two separate 
Requests for Filing Information for the 2010 and 2011 tax years. R453; SE4; 
SE8. Rasmussen responded that he did not owe taxes because he was an 
“employee working for wages, not income.” SE14. The Tax Commission 
apparently rejected this explanation, sending Rasmussen two separate 
Notices of Deficiency and Estimated Income Tax in May 2013 and requesting 
him to pay $2,904.55 for 2010 and $3,384.54 for 2011. SE5; SE9.  
 Rasmussen appealed those assessments. R450–51; SE15; SE16; SE17. As 
part of the appeals process, he submitted a memorandum presenting his 
interpretation of the tax code and he participated in an administrative 
hearing. R475; SE16. In his memorandum, Rasmussen stated that the IRS 
never contacted him to challenge his claim that he was exempt from 
withholding. SE16. Rasmussen also claimed that he believed in good faith 
that his employment wages were not income, and to support his position he 
–7– 
quoted from what he said were several United States Supreme Court cases, 
though many were from lower courts. SE16.2  
 In August 2015, the Tax Commission rejected Rasmussen’s appeal and 
upheld the assessment. R573, 599–600; SE17. 
 In November 2015, the Tax Commission sent Rasmussen two separate 
Notices of Taxes Due and Intent to Lien for the 2010 and 2011 tax years, 
directing Rasmussen to pay his tax deficiencies within one month. SE6; SE10. 
When Rasmussen did not pay, the Tax Commission sent him two separate 
Notices of Lien and Intent to Offset in January 2016. SE7; SE11. Rasmussen 
still did not pay. R446–47. The Tax Commission sent Rasmussen additional 
                                              
2 Though it is not clear on the face of Rasmussen’s memorandum, most 
of the cases he quoted—including several federal district court cases labeled 
as Supreme Court cases—addressed such questions as whether stock 
dividends are income, not whether wage compensation is income. SE16. The 
one case that is on points is Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). But Rasmussen 
quotes the party’s argument in that case as if it were the Court’s holding. 
Compare SE16, with Lucas, 281 U.S. at 112–13. The Court rejected that 
argument. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114. And it has more recently reiterated that the 
argument is “frivolous” and has been “repeatedly rejected by the courts.” 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 195 (1991). 
(When Lucas was decided, the Supreme Court Reporter often included 
excerpts from the parties’ arguments in the official report of the case, 
immediately preceding the opinion of the Court. While that language has 
been removed from Westlaw’s online publication of the report, it is available 




notices for tax years 2012 through 2015, with the total number of notices for 
all tax years reaching twenty-three. R473, 604; SE12; SE13. Yet Rasmussen did 
not file tax returns for the 2010 through 2015 tax years or pay any taxes for 
those years beyond a minimal amount withheld from his paychecks from 
2010 through 2013. R606–07; SE20; SE21. A Tax Commission investigator 
determined that Rasmussen owed $11,641 in taxes from 2010 through 2015. 
SE21.  
B. Summary of Proceedings 
 The State charged Rasmussen with one count of failure to render a tax 
return and one count of tax evasion for each tax year from 2010 to 2015, 
totaling six counts of tax evasion (a second-degree felony) and six counts of 
failure to render a tax return (a third-degree felony). R98–103. The State also 
charged Rasmussen with one count of a pattern of unlawful activity (a 
second-degree felony). R103–04.   
 At trial, Rasmussen’s defense was that he did not file tax returns or pay 
taxes based on a good-faith understanding that he was not required to do so. 
R418–21. Rasmussen asked the court to instruct the jury that “[a] person who 
acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to the requirements of the law does 
not act willfully even if his understanding of the law is wrong or 
–9– 
unreasonable.” R188. Rasmussen argued that this instruction should apply 
“to all of the tax statutes where willfulness is a requirement.” R514, 516.  
 The trial court ruled that the instruction “goes too far” “the way it’s 
written.” R516. Although the court did not elaborate on its reasoning, the 
context of the parties’ arguments and the court’s questions indicate that the 
court was concerned that the jury would apply the unreasonable-belief 
instruction to all counts, and not just the counts requiring a willful mental 
state. R512–16.  
 Tax evasion requires an intentional or willful mental state. Utah Code 
§76-8-1101(1)(d)(i).3 The elements instructions for each count of tax evasion 
included this mental state. R240, 242, 244, 246, 248, 250. The mental state for 
failure to file a tax return changed in 2014. Before 2014, failure to file required 
an intent to evade. Utah Code §76-8-1101(1)(c)(i) (superseded 5/13/2014). 
Beginning in 2014, a person could be guilty of failing to file only if he acted 
“knowingly and intentionally, and without a reasonable good faith basis.” 
Utah Code §76-8-1101(1)(c)(i). The elements instructions for failure to file for 
                                              
3 The State cites to the code published on the Utah Legislature’s 
website, and unless otherwise noted, any citation is to the current version of 
the code. 
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tax years 2014 and 2015 thus included an explicit requirement that any good-
faith belief be reasonable. R249, 251.  
 Rasmussen conceded that his proposed instruction would not apply to 
the last two counts of failure to file. R513. The court asked Rasmussen how 
he could reword the proposed good-faith instruction to make that clear, and 
Rasmussen responded that the instruction’s reference to willfulness sufficed 
to limit its application to the tax-evasion counts. R513–14. The court 
disagreed, but it said it “might reconsider” if Rasmussen wanted to “try a 
redraft.” R516. Rasmussen never proposed a revised instruction to account 
for the court’s concern. 
 Additional instructions addressed a good-faith defense. The jury was 
instructed that “intent to evade” requires proof of “a conscious desire to 
avoid a legal requirement with which the actor knows he or she is obligated 
to comply.” R253. The jury was further instructed specific to the pre-2014 
failure-to-file counts that “[a]n intent not to file a tax return, even if required 
by law to file, is an ‘intent to evade’ only if the actor is aware that he or she is 
legally required to file.” R261. Finally, the jury was instructed consistent with 
the general mistake-of-law statute: Ignorance or mistake about “the existence 
or meaning” of the law is no defense unless “the actor reasonably believed his 
conduct did not constitute an offense” and the belief was based on reasonable 
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reliance on (1) an official statement by an agency charged with enforcing the 
law in question or (2) a written interpretation by a court or public servant 
charged with interpreting the law in question. R265 (emphasis added). In 
closing, Rasmussen argued that he acted under a reasonable, good-faith belief 
that he was not required to pay taxes or file a return. R648, 651–54. 
 The court dismissed the pattern-of-unlawful-activity charge for 
insufficient evidence. R569. The jury convicted Rasmussen of four counts—
one count of tax evasion for 2015 and three counts of failure to render tax 
returns for 2013 through 2015—and acquitted him of the remaining counts. 
R247–51, 279–80. The court sentenced Rasmussen to concurrent terms of zero 
to five years on the three counts of failure to file and one to 15 years on the 
single count of tax evasion. R292–93. The court ordered Rasmussen to pay the 
back taxes, penalties, and interest as restitution. R293, 313–14.  Rasmussen 
timely appealed. R295.   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Rasmussen claims that the trial court should have given his good-faith 
defense instruction. He contends that a key element of a good-faith defense 
for tax evasion and failure to file a tax return is that a good-faith 
misunderstanding of the law need not be reasonable. He also contends that 
he was entitled to a separate instruction on this good-faith defense—that the 
–12– 
instructions on mental state were insufficient to adequately present the 
defense to the jury.  
 This Court should not reach Rasmussen’s claim that he was entitled to 
the instruction he requested because he has not challenged the basis of the 
trial court’s ruling. The court did not directly reach the question of whether 
reasonableness was required for tax evasion and pre-2014 charges of failure 
to file a tax return. Rather, the court ruled that because the failure-to-file 
statute changed in 2014 to explicitly require that any good-faith 
misunderstanding of the law be reasonable, Rasmussen’s requested 
instruction went too far. Rasmussen has not grappled with that ruling, and 
he has therefore forfeited any right to review of the trial court’s actual ruling. 
 In any event, this Court need not decide whether Rasmussen was 
entitled to the instruction he sought because any error was harmless. First, as 
to the two convictions of failure to file a tax return for 2014 and 2015, the 
statute explicitly required a reasonable good-faith basis. Thus, any 
instruction on an unreasonable good-faith basis would not have applied to 
these counts, and denial of the instruction at most could have affected the 
2013 conviction for failure to file a tax return and the 2015 conviction for tax 
evasion.  
–13– 
 But there is no prejudice even as to those two convictions. Rasmussen 
explained his understanding of the law to the Tax Commission, and it was 
rejected. The jury acquitted Rasmussen of every count that related to his 
actions before Rasmussen received notice that he owed taxes and that his 
understanding of the law was wrong. But it convicted him of offenses starting 
with the 2013 tax year. And by the time Rasmussen had to file his 2013 taxes—
April 2014—he was already on notice that his interpretation of the tax code 
was wrong. Even if the jury had been instructed that Rasmussen’s belief did 
not have to be reasonable, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have found that he held that belief in good faith by 2014. 
 Rasmussen’s claim also fails on the merits. Although the law in Utah is 
unclear on whether an unreasonable misunderstanding of the law can negate 
a mental state—and Rasmussen has not carried his burden to show that this 
unsettled point should be resolved in his favor—the law is clear on one point: 
instructing the jury on the mental state required for an offense is adequate to 





Rasmussen does not challenge the basis of the trial 
court’s ruling; in any event, he was not prejudiced 
when the trial court declined to give an instruction 
stating that his good-faith belief need not be 
reasonable, nor was he entitled to the instruction. 
 Rasmussen challenges the trial court’s refusal to give his requested 
good-faith defense instruction. He argues that a good-faith belief that he was 
not required to pay or file taxes is a complete defense to both tax evasion and 
failure to file a tax return, even if his belief was unreasonable. Br.Aplt.9–14. 
He also argues that a separate good-faith belief instruction was required to 
adequately instruct the jury. Br.Aplt.15–18. Finally, Rasmussen argues that 
he was prejudiced by the exclusion of his proposed instruction. Br.Aplt.18–
19. 
 This Court should not address Rasmussen’s claim because he has not 
challenged the basis of the trial court’s ruling. In any event, Rasmussen has 
failed to establish either prejudice or error in the denial of the instruction.  
Rasmussen could not have continued to hold a good-faith belief that he owed 
no taxes after he was authoritatively told that his interpretation of the tax law 
was wrong. And as a matter of law, the mental-state instruction sufficiently 
apprised the jury of the good-faith defense. 
–15– 
A. This Court should disregard Rasmussen’s claim because he 
does not challenge the basis of the trial court’s decision. 
 As a threshold matter, this Court should decline to consider 
Rasmussen’s claim because he has not carried his burden of persuasion on 
appeal. “[O]ne of the most fundamental principles of the appellate process” 
is that an appellant must “identify … flaws in the district court’s order.” Allen 
v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶4, 194 P.3d 903. Thus, “[t]o carry his burden of 
persuasion on appeal, an appellant must address ‘the actual basis for the 
district court’s ruling.’” Gollaher v. State, 2017 UT App 168, ¶13, 405 P.3d 831. 
An appellant “cannot make the same arguments anew while ignoring the 
proceedings below that adjudicated the same issues.” State v. Newton, 2018 
UT App 194, ¶20, --- P.3d ----. If an appellant does not challenge the actual 
basis of the trial court’s ruling, “that decision will be placed beyond the reach 
of further review.” Allen, 2008 UT 56, ¶7; see also id. ¶¶4, 7, 14, 15 (refusing to 
consider claim when appellant “failed to address any of the district court’s 
holdings”); State v. Needham, 2016 UT App 235, ¶2, 391 P.3d 295 (same). 
 When Rasmussen asked the trial court for an instruction that a good-
faith belief need not be reasonable, the court rejected the instruction because 
it went “too far” given the legislature’s inclusion of a reasonableness 
requirement in 2014 for failure to file a tax return. R512–16. The court invited 
Rasmussen to submit a revised instruction to address this concern, but he did 
–16– 
not do so. R516. The court appears to have been concerned that even with the 
proposed instruction’s reference to willfulness, the jury may have been 
confused as to when a good-faith belief needs to be reasonable and when it 
does not. That concern is valid. Two counts referred explicitly to a 
reasonableness requirement, and the statutory mistake-of-law instruction—
to which Rasmussen did not object—also included a reasonableness 
requirement.  R249, 251, 265, 516–17. Including another instruction stating 
that a mistake of law need not be reasonable, without clarifying which counts 
it applied to or how it related to the statutory mistake-of-law instruction, 
would have confused the jury. See State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶31, 236 
P.3d 161 (equating good-faith defense with mistake-of-law defense); 
Br.Aplt.14 (same). 
 Because Rasmussen has not addressed what actually happened at trial, 
and has not shown why the trial court’s actual ruling was erroneous, this 
Court should reject his claim without further consideration. 
B. Even if Rasmussen was entitled to an instruction that a good-
faith belief need not be reasonable, its exclusion was not 
prejudicial because Rasmussen was repeatedly informed that 
his belief was incorrect. 
 Appellate Courts “do not upset the verdict of a jury merely because 
some error or irregularity may have occurred.” State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 
1329 (Utah 1980). Only if a defendant demonstrates with reasonable 
–17– 
likelihood that a “substantial and prejudicial” error affected the outcome of 
his trial will a reviewing court reverse. Id. In the context of alleged error in 
failing to instruct the jury on a defense, that analysis considers whether there 
is a “‘reasonable likelihood’ that the outcome of trial would have been any 
different” had the instruction been given. State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶43, 349 
P.3d 712. 
 There is no reasonable likelihood of a better result for Rasmussen had 
the jury received a separate instruction stating that his legal interpretation 
need not be reasonable.  
 First, any instruction would necessarily exclude the two charges for 
failure to file a tax return for 2014 and 2015. The statute explicitly required 
proof that Rasmussen act “without a reasonable good faith basis.” Utah 
Code §76-8-1101(1)(c)(i). Even if Rasmussen were entitled to an instruction 
on an unreasonable good-faith defense, that instruction would have been 
limited to the tax-evasion charges and perhaps the pre-2014 failure-to-file 
charges. And Rasmussen was acquitted of all but two of those counts. Thus, 
denial of the instruction at most could have affected the 2013 conviction for 
failure to file a tax return and the 2015 conviction for tax evasion. 
 But even as to those two convictions, any error was harmless. 
Rasmussen relies on Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), to establish 
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that his good-faith defense need not be reasonable. But Cheek recognized 
that notices like those Rasmussen received from the Tax Commission may 
lead a jury to reject a defendant’s claim that his interpretation of the law 
was held in good faith. Id. at 202. In Cheek, for example, the defendant 
allegedly believed, like Rasmussen, that wages are not income. Id. at 195. 
The Court held that the defendant’s belief need not be reasonable to avail 
himself of the good-faith defense. Id. at 202–03. But the Court noted that the 
jury’s assessment of whether the defendant “truly believed” he did not have 
to pay taxes or file a tax return would turn on evidence showing the 
defendant’s awareness of “the relevant provisions of the Code or 
regulations, … court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law, … 
authoritative rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, or … any contents of 
the personal income tax return forms and accompanying instructions that 
made it plain that wages should be returned as income.” Id. at 202. The 
Court also acknowledged that “the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs 
or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be 
nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties.” Id. at 
203–04. And disagreement with the law is not a defense. Id. at 205–06. 
 By Rasmussen’s own account, he based his interpretation in part on 
IRS publications. But one of the exhibits the jury received included an IRS 
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publication that plainly included wages in the definition of earned income. 
SE21. And the Tax Commission told Rasmussen that his contrary 
interpretation was wrong. Yet he continued to not pay taxes. Given the 
evidence against him, there is no reasonable likelihood that a jury would have 
found that Rasmussen acted in good faith, even if it had been instructed that 
the belief need not be reasonable. 
 The State presented substantial evidence that Rasmussen knew he was 
violating the law—in other words, that Rasmussen did not hold his belief in 
good faith. Cf. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶40 (concluding that error was harmless 
because of “overwhelming evidence” against defendant). In 2013 the Tax 
Commission sent Rasmussen two separate Requests for Filing Information. 
R453; SE4; SE8. Rasmussen explained his theory to the Tax Commission, 
SE14, and in response the Tax Commission sent Rasmussen two separate 
Notices of Deficiency and Estimated Income Tax. SE5; SE9. All of these 
notices occurred before April 2014, when Rasmussen was required to file his 
2013 taxes. R247, 279–80. Yet Rasmussen did not choose to pay his taxes 
under protest and contest the validity of the Tax Commission’s interpretation 
in court. Cf. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205–06 (discussing avenues available for 
someone to challenge the legitimacy of the tax code). Instead, he chose not to 
file his taxes. 
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 And by April 2016—the time of Rasmussen’s first and only conviction 
for tax evasion—Rasmussen had more fully explained his theory to the Tax 
Commission through the administrative appeals process, SE16, the Tax 
Commission rejected his interpretation and upheld the assessment, SE17, and 
the Tax Commission sent him additional notices for other tax years, with the 
total number of notices reaching twenty-three. R473. Despite all of this, 
Rasmussen maintained that he had a good-faith belief that he was not 
violating the law. But there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would 
have agreed if only it had been told that Rasmussen’s good-faith belief could 
be unreasonable. Reasonable or not, Rasmussen knew his interpretation was 
wrong by the time he did not file his 2013 taxes, and certainly by the time he 
evaded his 2015 taxes. 
 Even if omitting a separate jury instruction on good faith was error, it 
could not have affected two of his convictions. And for the remaining two 
convictions for which the instruction would have been relevant, it is not 
reasonably likely that the jury would have believed Rasmussen’s good-faith 
defense. 
C. Rasmussen was not entitled to a separate good-faith defense 
instruction.  
 Rasmussen argues that because tax evasion and failure to file a tax 
return require a mental state of specific intent to violate the law, even an 
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unreasonable but good-faith belief that he was not required to pay taxes 
would be a complete defense. Br.Aplt.9–15. Rasmussen further argues that 
instructing the jury on the requisite mental state was insufficient to 
adequately convey a good-faith defense; rather, a separate good-faith 
instruction was necessary. Br.Aplt.15–19. 
 Rasmussen has not established that an unreasonable mistake of law is 
a defense under Utah law. But even if it were, Utah law is clear that 
defendants are not entitled to separate good-faith instructions when the 
defense is aimed at negating an element of the offense. 
 The general rule in criminal cases is that “‘ignorance or mistake of law 
provides no defense or excuse for a crime … [, and] a good faith or mistaken 
belief that one’s conduct is legal does not relieve a person of criminal liability 
for engaging in proscribed conduct.’” Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶30 (quoting 
what is now 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §132 (2019 update)); accord Cheek, 
498 U.S. at 199. 
There are two common exceptions to this rule. One is a “narrow 
exception” that excuses otherwise criminal conduct when the defendant acts 
with a mistaken belief that he is not violating the law and “the mistake arises 
from a reasonable reliance on an official written statement of the law.” Steele, 
2010 UT App 185, ¶30. The other negates the mental state for a specific-intent 
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crime—or a crime that requires awareness of or intent to violate the law—
when the defendant mistakenly believes in good faith that his actions do not 
violate the law. Id. ¶31; Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199–202; 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §5.6(a) (3d ed. Oct. 2018 update). Unlike with the 
excuse-based exception, some courts have held that under the mental-state 
exception the defendant’s misunderstanding of the law need not be 
reasonable. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202–03. 
 Utah clearly adopted the first, excuse-based exception when it enacted 
the mistake-of-law statute. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶30; see Utah Code §76-
2-304(2) (stating that ignorance or mistake of law is a defense only when 
defendant’s belief that his conduct did not constitute an offense is reasonable 
and is based on an official written statement either from a court, 
administrative agency, or public servant charged with interpreting the law in 
question). 
 But this Court has stated that it is an open question whether Utah’s 
mistake-of-law statute was intended to “define the exclusive exception to the 
general prohibition on the mistake of law defense or whether there remains 
room for a specific intent exception.” Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶32. The Court 
also stated that even in jurisdictions that recognize a mental-state exception, 
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courts have not uniformly allowed unreasonable mistakes to negate a 
required mental state. Id. ¶31. 
 The mistake-of-law statute speaks in absolute terms, stating that 
“[i]gnorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law 
is no defense to a crime unless” the specific conditions of the statute are 
satisfied. Utah Code §76-2-304(2) (emphases added); see also Utah Code §76-
1-103(1) (“The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the 
punishment for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code … .”); 
Utah Code §76-2-304(1) (treating negation of mental state as affirmative 
defense for purposes of mistake-of-fact defense). On its face, the mistake-of-
law statute appears to allow for the mental-state exception only as long as the 
defendant’s misunderstanding was reasonable and was based on a written 
official interpretation of the law.4  
                                              
4 In State v. Granato, 610 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1980), the supreme court 
overturned a conviction where the defendant had no knowledge that he was 
violating a campaign contribution law. Id. at 1291–92. A dissenting opinion 
suggested that the conditions of the mistake-of-law statute had not been 
satisfied. Id. at 1293 (Christoffersen, J., dissenting). The majority ruled that the 
evidence of intent was insufficient, but it merely acknowledged the mistake-
of-law statute without analyzing it. Id. at 1292 (majority opinion). While the 
result of Granato is consistent with recognizing a separate mental-state 
exception that coexists with the mistake-of-law statute, the court’s silence on 
the issue supports this Court’s subsequent conclusion that it is an open 
question. 
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 Although some Utah cases have spoken generically of a good-faith 
defense, they have been inconsistent on when it applies, they have been silent 
on whether an unreasonable mistake would suffice, and they have been silent 
on whether the mistake-of-law statute was intended to be the exclusive 
exception to the general rule.5 
 Rasmussen has not addressed the plain language of the mistake-of-law 
statute, let alone explained why that statute does not occupy the field when 
it comes to mistake-of-law defenses. And while he refers to State v. Steele—
the case in which this Court acknowledged that the issue was unsettled—he 
quotes only the portion of the opinion that says the mental-state exception 
“‘arguably’” applies in Utah. Br.Aplt.14 (quoting Steele, 2010 UT App 185, 
¶32). Rasmussen’s failure to engage the issue this Court has identified 
                                              
5 See State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ¶19, 179 P.3d 792 (implicitly recognizing 
good-faith defense for tax evasion, which requires an intentional or willful 
mental state); State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357, 1360 & n.8 (Utah 1993) 
(concluding that good-faith defense was unavailable because securities fraud 
statute required willful mental state but not specific intent); State v. Stringham, 
2001 UT App 13, ¶¶20–21, 17 P.3d 1153 (recognizing good-faith defense in 
communications fraud case requiring reckless mental state); see also Bryan v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–96 (1998) (distinguishing Cheek and 
concluding that firearms statute requiring showing of willful violation of law 
“does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the 
law is no excuse”). Cf. Benjamin v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011 UT 14, ¶32, 
250 P.3d 39 (recognizing reasonable, good-faith defense to civil tax penalty 
imposed for negligence). 
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amounts to a failure to carry his burden to show that he is entitled to an 
instruction stating that an unreasonable mistake of law negates a willful 
mental state. This Court should reject Rasmussen’s claim without deciding 
whether he was entitled to the instruction. See State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, 
¶21, 147 P.3d 448 (“It falls squarely upon an appellant to surmount the filing, 
briefing, and persuasion burdens associated with an appeal. … An appellate 
court that does the lifting for an appellant distorts this fundamental allocation 
of benefits and burdens.”).  
 But even if a mental-state exception survives the mistake-of-law 
statute, and even if an unreasonable misunderstanding of the law can negate 
the mental states at issue in this case, Rasmussen was not entitled to a 
separate good-faith instruction to that effect. This Court has squarely held 
that instructions on the required mental state are adequate to convey a good-
faith defense. In State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, 17 P.3d 1153, the Court 
explained that “‘a jury finding that the defendant has acted knowingly and 
willfully is inconsistent with a finding that the defendant acted in good 
faith.’” Id. ¶¶20–21. The Court thus held that a separate good-faith instruction 
is “‘merely surplusage,’” “a redundant version’” of the instructions on the 
required mental state. Id. ¶20. This Court later applied that holding to the 
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very statutes at issue here—tax evasion and failure to file a tax return. State 
v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, ¶¶21–23, 72 P.3d 692.  
  The primary case Rasmussen relies on—State v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716 
(10th Cir. 1984) (en banc)—has been overruled on this very point because 
every federal circuit “has come to reject the idea that district courts must give 
a separate ‘good faith’ jury instruction in fraud cases.” United States v. 
Bowling, No. 08–6184, 2009 WL 6854970, at *1 n.* (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2009) (en 
banc). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has  rejected this argument 
in the context of tax law. In the very case Rasmussen relies on to establish that 
a good-faith mistake of law need not be reasonable, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that “after instructing the jury on willfulness, ‘[a]n additional 
instruction on good faith [is] unnecessary.” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201 (first 
alteration in original). 
 The law in Utah and elsewhere is clear: A separate good-faith 
instruction is unnecessary. The jury was instructed that to convict Rasmussen 
of tax evasion, it had to find that he intentionally or willfully attempted to 
evade or defeat a tax that he owed. R240, 256. The jury was told that a person 
acts intentionally or willfully “when it is his or her conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” R252. It was instructed 
that evade means “avoidance of something by effort, skill, dexterity, 
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contrivance, subterfuge, ingenuity, or artifice,” and that “intent to evade” 
requires proof of “a conscious desire to avoid a legal requirement with which 
the actor knows he or she is obligated to comply.” R253.  
 On the pre-2014 failure-to-file counts, the jury was instructed that it 
had to find that Rasmussen acted with intent to evade or with a “conscious 
desire to evade.” R241, 261. It was further instructed that “[a]n intent not to 
file a tax return, even if required by law to file, is an ‘intent to evade’ only if 
the actor is aware that he or she is legally required to file.” R261. And for the 
2014 and 2015 failure-to-file counts, the elements instructions stated that the 
jury could only convict Rasmussen if it found that he acted knowingly and 
intentionally and “without a reasonable good faith basis.” R249, 251; see also 
R262 (defining “intentionally” and “knowingly”).  
 Nothing in the instructions precluded Rasmussen from arguing on the 
tax evasion and pre-2014 failure-to-file charges that his understanding of the 
law need not have been reasonable. Rather, the instructions adequately 
conveyed to the jury that if Rasmussen in good faith believed, even 
unreasonably as to the pre-2014 counts, that he did not owe taxes and was 
not required to file a tax return, he did not act willfully, intentionally, or 
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knowingly. Taken as a whole, these instructions “‘fairly instruct the jury on 
the law applicable to the case.’” Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶148.6 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the State asks this Court to affirm 
Rasmussen’s convictions.  
 Respectfully submitted on April 1, 2019. 
  SEAN D. REYES 
  Utah Attorney General 
 
/s/ William M. Hains 
  WILLIAM M. HAINS 
  Assistant Solicitor General 
  Counsel for Appellee 
 
 
                                              
6 In his prejudice argument, Rasmussen makes several unpreserved 
challenges to the accuracy of the mental state in the elements instructions on 
the 2014 and 2015 failure-to-file charges, which largely track the statutory 
language. Br.Aplt.18–19; see also R249, 251; Utah Code §76-8-1101(1)(c).  
Rasmussen invited any error in these instructions when he told the trial court 
that he had no further objections to the jury instructions beyond the one 
instruction that was rejected. R516–17; State v. Crespo, 2017 UT App 219, ¶22 
n.5, 409 P.3d 99 (“Because defense counsel stated that he did not have any 
objections to the jury instructions at trial, the invited error doctrine precludes 
us from reviewing this claim under plain error.”). 
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76-2-304 Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental 
state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a 
crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute 
an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an 
administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; 
or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record or made by a 
public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a defense to the offense 
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser included offense of which he would be 
guilty if the fact or law were as he believed. 




76-8-1101 Criminal offenses and penalties relating to revenue and taxation -- Rulemaking 
authority -- Statute of limitations. 
( 1) 
(a) As provided in Section 59-1-401, criminal offenses and penalties are as provided in 
Subsections (1 )(b) through (e). 
{b) 
(i) Any person who is required by Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any laws the State Tax 
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from the 
State Tax Commission, who operates without having registered or secured a license or 
permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(b)(i), the penalty may not: 
(A) be less than $500; or 
{B) exceed $1,000. 
(c) 
(i) With respect to a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401, any person who 
knowingly and intentionally, and without a reasonable good faith basis, fails to make, render, 
sign, or verify any return within the time required by law or to supply any information within 
the time required by law, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent 
return or statement, or who supplies any false or fraudulent information, is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(c)(i), the penalty may not: 
(A) be less than $1,000; or 
(B) exceed $5,000. 
(d) 
(i) Any person who intentionally or willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax, fee, or charge 
as defined in Section 59-1-401 or the payment of a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 
59-1-401 is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second degree felony. 
{ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(d)(i), the penalty may not: 
(A) be less than $1,500; or 
(B) exceed $25,000. 
(e) 
(i) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if that person commits an act: 
(A) described in Subsection (1 )(e)(ii) with respect to one or more of the following documents: 
(I) a return; 
(II) an affidavit; 
{Ill) a claim; or 
(IV) a document similar to Subsections (1 )(e)(i)(A)(I) through (Ill); and 
(B) subject to Subsection (1 )(e)(iii), with knowledge that the document described in 
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A): 
( I) is false or fraudulent as to any material matter; and 
(II) could be used in connection with any material matter administered by the State Tax 
Commission. 
(ii) The following acts apply to Subsection (1 )(e)(i): 
(A) preparing any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); 
(B) presenting any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); 
(C) procuring any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); 
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(D) advising in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in 
Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); 
(E) aiding in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in 
Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); 
(F) assisting in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in 
Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); or 
(G) counseling in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in 
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A). 
(iii) This Subsection (1 )(e) applies: 
(A) regardless of whether the person for which the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i) 
(A) is prepared or presented: 
(I) knew of the falsity of the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); or 
(11) consented to the falsity of the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); and 
(B) in addition to any other penalty provided by law. 
(iv) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of this Subsection (1 )(e), the penalty may 
not: 
(A) be less than $1,500; or 
(B) exceed $25,000. 
(v) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the State Tax 
Commission may make rules prescribing the documents that are similar to Subsections (1) 
(e)(i)(A)(I) through (Ill). 
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is the later of six years: 
(a) from the date the tax should have been remitted; or 
(b) after the day on which the person commits the criminal offense. 




76-8-1101 Criminal offenses and penalties relating to revenue and taxation -- Rulemaking 
authority -- Statute of limitations. 
(1) 
(a) As provided in Section 59-1-401, criminal offenses and penalties are as provided in 
Subsections (1 )(b) through (e). 
(b) 
(i) Any person who is required by Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any laws the State Tax 
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from the 
State Tax Commission, who operates without having registered or secured a license or 
permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(b)(i), the penalty may not: 
(A) be less than $500; or 
(B) exceed $1,000. 
(c) 
(i) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401 
or requirement of Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any lawful requirement of the 
State Tax Commission, fails to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any 
information within the time required by law, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any 
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or fraudulent information, 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )(c)(i), the penalty may not: 
(A) be less than $1,000; or 
(B) exceed $5,000. 
(d) 
(i) Any person who intentionally or willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax, fee, or charge 
as defined in Section 59-1-401 or the payment of a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 
59-1-401 is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second degree felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection ( 1 )( d)(i), the penalty may not: 
(A) be less than $1,500; or 
(B) exceed $25,000. 
(e) 
(i) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if that person commits an act: 
(A) described in Subsection (1 )(e)(ii) with respect to one or more of the following documents: 
(I) a return; 
(II) an affidavit; 
(Ill) a claim; or 
(IV) a document similar to Subsections (1 )(e)(i)(A)(I) through (Ill); and 
(B) subject to Subsection (1 )(e)(iii), with knowledge that the document described in 
Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A): 
(I) is false or fraudulent as to any material matter; and 
(II) could be used in connection with any material matter administered by the State Tax 
Commission. 
(ii) The following acts apply to Subsection (1 )(e)(i): 
(A) preparing any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); 
(B) presenting any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); 
(C) procuring any portion of a document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); 
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(D) advising in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in 
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A); 
(E) aiding in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in 
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A); 
(F) assisting in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in 
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A); or 
(G) counseling in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in 
Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i)(A). 
(iii) This Subsection (1 )(e) applies: 
(A) regardless of whether the person for which the document described in Subsection ( 1 )( e )(i) 
(A) is prepared or presented: 
(I) knew of the falsity of the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); or 
(II) consented to the falsity of the document described in Subsection (1 )(e)(i)(A); and 
(B) in addition to any other penalty provided by law. 
(iv) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of this Subsection (1 )(e), the penalty may 
not: 
{A) be less than $1,500; or 
(B) exceed $25,000. 
(v) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the State Tax 
Commission may make rules prescribing the documents that are similar to Subsections ( 1) 
(e)(i)(A)(I) through (111). 
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is the later of six years: 
(a) from the date the tax should have been remitted; or 
(b) after the day on which the person commits the criminal offense. 
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Addendum B 
Argument & Ruling on 
Requested Good-faith Defense Instruction 
(R512-17) 
1 MR. PALUMBO: It says, "The government must prove 
2 beyond a reasonable doubt that ~.r. Rasmussen knew that the law 
3 imposed a duty on him and Mr. Rasmussen intentionally and 
4 voluntarily violated that duty." 
5 THE COURT: This is a defense request? 
6 MR. PALUMBO: It is, Your Honor. 
MR. HANSEEN: It is. 7 
8 THE COURT: Okay. "The government must prove," and 
9 what's your argument there? 
10 MR. PALUMBO: Well, my argument is that it says that 
11 Mr. Rasmussen intentionally and voluntarily violated that duty. 
12 Those are not the mental states that the State is required to 
13 prove. So that's one concern. 
14 The other concern is in the second paragraph. It 
15 says, "A person who acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to 
16 requirements of the law does not act willfully even if his 
17 understanding of the law is wrong or unreasonable." 
18 In the amended failure to file count -- the good 
19 faith belief actually has to be reasonable in order to be a 
20 defense to the mental state. So saying that it could be 
21 unreasonable for those two counts is legally wrong. So that's 
22 my objection to that. 
23 And then I also do not believe that that would apply 
24 to the other counts that are charged. 
25 THE COURT: Defense? 
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1 MR. RICKEY: Judge, in so far -- I mean, this 
2 instruction comes from the Cheek decision in so far as far as 
3 the two new statutes specifically say that a good faith belief 
4 must be reasonable. 
THE COURT: On that the -- which statute? 5 
6 MR. RICKEY: The two -- the evasion statutes for I 
7 believe it's 2015 and '16, failure to render -- sorry, not the 
8 evasion, the failure to render. Yeah, I would agree that 
9 the -- since those specifically say that the good faith belief 
10 needs to be reasonable, that that language -- the 
11 unreasonableness language shouldn't apply. 
12 THE COURT: So how would you reword it to meet the 
13 objection of the State? 
MR. PALUMBO: Your Honor, in fact --14 
15 MR. RICKEY: I understand willfully, Judge, to answer 
16 your question, I think the sentence should say the law -- a 
17 person who acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to 
18 requirements of the law, and we can even make relative to the 
19 failure to render counts does not act willfully in that 
20 sentence there. 
21 THE COURT: So honest mistake is not acting 
22 willfully? Is that where you're going? I don't know exactly 
23 what you would -- how you get around the problem here. 
24 MR. RICKEY: Right, Judge, I think that -- I mean, 












I think that 
Counts. 
10 and 12. 
10 and 12. 
That a good faith reasonable belief 
also given, given the ruling in Cheek, I 
6 believe it applies to all of the tax statutes where willfulness 
7 is a requirement. That's the argument we're making. That one 
8 can have the good faith belief as a defense to not 
9 understanding the duty imposed by the tax law. 
10 THE COURT: Well, so you're saying if your client had 
11 an opinion that the law did not impose a duty on him, that he 
12 can't be found to intentionally violate that duty, huh? 
13 MR. HANSEEN: Not necessarily. And, Your Honor, I 
14 think the case law suggests good faith belief relative to the 
15 federal 
16 THE COURT: Let's see, have we defined good faith 
17 belief in this --
18 
19 
MR. HANSEEN: No. 
THE COURT: Is there a definition of good faith 
20 belief anywhere? 
21 MR. PALUMBO: The reference that defense counsel 
22 included with the proposed jury instruction was to Cheek versus 
23 United States, which is Utah -- or I'm sorry, a Supreme Court 
24 of the United States case, and it was an interpretation of the 
25 IRS's criminal statute which is distinct from the Utah statute. 
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1 They are similar, but the mental state that was at issue in the 
2 IRS statute is willfulness. That is a component of mental 
3 state for one charge in this case, the evasion statute. But 
4 again, I think just quoting to the holding of Cheek is improper 
5 in this case because our mental states are completely 
6 different. 
7 And so I'm not sure if that actually solves the 
8 problem. Furthermore, the legislature introduced a good faith 
9 exception to the mental state in 2014. 
10 THE COURT: Right. 
11 MR. PALUMBO: They know how to do that. They did not 
12 include it for evasion. They did not include before 2014. I 
13 think that shows the legislative intent not to have good faith 
14 defense or exception to the evasion or failure to file a 
15 statute prior to 2014. 
16 THE COURT: How about after 2014? 
17 MR. PALUMBO: After 2014 for the failure to file, 
18 there is absolutely in the statute a good faith defense. 
19 THE COURT: Well, yes. 
20 MR. PALUMBO: The good faith has to be reasonable. 
21 The belief has to be reasonable or else it's not a defense. An 
22 unreasonable defense does not work post 2014 failure to file. 
23 MR. RICKEY: And, Judge, just to address that 
24 THE COURT: So your opposition is to the -- if his 
25 understanding is unreasonable that they are arguing here should 
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1 apply, you are saying no way. 
2 MR. PALUMBO: Correct. 
3 MR. JONES: Correct, it's not the law. 
4 MR. RICKEY: And, Your Honor, just if I may briefly. 
5 We also referenced in this -- one of the other citation was the 
6 Eyre case. I understand the concern, the Cheek is a federal --
7 it involves the federal tax statute. Eyre does say that when 
8 statutes are similar to one another, Utah will look at the 
9 federal statute as well as the reasoning and the case law 
10 behind how the federal statute has been applied and that's why 
11 I think the way -- the way the United States Supreme Court 
12 addressed willfulness relative to the federal tax statutes, I 
13 think it should -- it can equally apply to Utah statutes when 
14 willfulness is a mental state requirement. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I'm -- I'm going to not allow this 
16 instruction the way it's written to come in. If you wish to 
17 try a redraft and maybe a real informal brief on it, I might 
18 reconsider that before we actually give it, but I -- I don't 
19 think this instruction would be proper. It goes too far. 
20 What I did this morning is when I saw you had 
21 filed these proposed instructions, I just asked her to put them 
22 in and we would discuss them and that's what I am doing here. 
23 Anything else? 
24 
25 
MR. PALUMBO: Not from the State, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Defense? 
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1 MR. HANSEEN: No, Your Honor. We'll --
2 THE COURT: So other than this instruction, we're in 
3 agreement on the instructions? 
MR. HANSEEN: Yes, I believe so. 4 
5 THE COURT: So we pull out your No. 27 and what was 
6 this one you numbered? 
7 
8 
MR. HANSEEN: 35. 
THE COURT: 35. 
9 Now, do you have any concern about this ordering that 
10 I've done? It's a little unique, I acknowledge, but I've 
11 tried, like I said, to make it clear. I did not want to throw 
12 in the RICO with everything else, frankly. I wanted to see 
13 what -- or have them look at the elements of that. I don't 
14 know how they are going to do it in the jury room, but you 
15 never know. But at least I wanted to separate them a bit from 
16 each other so they just don't get overwhelmed with all of this 
17 legalese stuff we've got. Willful, all of these definitions 
18 that keep popping up in different places that are a little 
19 different are confusing frankly. 
20 Okay. We'll see you at 8:30 in the morning. 
21 MR. PALUMBO: Thanks, Judge. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 22 
23 MR. HANSEEN: Judge, maybe one more housekeeping 
24 issue before we go. I guess procedurally, I don't know where 
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00187 
Jury Instruction __ 
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Rasmussen 
knew that the law imposed a duty on him, and Mr. Rasmussen intentionally and 
voluntarily violated that duty. 
A person who acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to the requirements 
of the law does not act willfully even if his understanding of the law is wrong or 
unreasonable. Nevertheless, merely disagreeing with the law does not constitute a 
good faith misunderstanding of the law. To find Mr. Rasmussen guilty, the 
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have 
a good faith belief that he was complying with the law. 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991); State v. EyTe, 2008 UT 16, ,i 13; 
179 P.3d 72, 796. 
00188 
Jury Instruction __ 
To prove that Mr. Rasmussen intentionally or willfully attempted to evade 
any tax, fee, or charge previously defined, the State must first prove the existence of 
a tax deficiency. If the State has not proved the existence of such a deficiency, you 
must find Mr. Rasmussen not guilty. 
State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16 ,r 14·15; 179 P.3d 792, 796-797. 
00189 
Jury Instruction __ 
"Evade" is defined as avoidance of something by effort, skill, dexterity, 
contrivance, subterfuge, ingenuity, or artifice. In order to prove that Mr. Rasmussen 
had an intent to evade, the State must prove a conscious desire to avoid a legal 
requirement with which the actor knows he or she is obligated to comply. 
An intent not to file a tax return, even if required by law to file, is an "intent 
to evade" only if the actor is aware that he or she is legally required to file. 
Silver v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Com'n, 820 P.2d 912, 915 (1991) 
00190 
AddendumD 
Jury Instructions 1-26 
(R240-66) 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ ---=---
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 1 with committing Tax Evasion on or 
about April 18, 2011. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the 
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted; 
(3) To evade or defeat; 
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; OR 
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00240 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1,_ 
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 2 with committing Failure to Render 
Tax Returns on or about April 18, 2011. You cannot convict him of this offense unless 
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) With intent to evade any 
a. Tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or 
b. Requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or 
c. Any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission 
' 
(3) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information 
within the time required by law; or 
(4) Made, rendered, signed or verified any false or fraudulent return or statement; 
or 
(5) Supplied any false or fraudulent information. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUil TY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00241 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ---
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 3 with committing Tax Evasion on or 
about April 17, 2012. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the 
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted; 
(3) To evade or defeat; 
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; OR 
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUil TY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00242 
INSTRUCTION NO. _Y __ 
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 4 with committing Failure to Render 
Tax Returns on or about April 17, 2012. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, 
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) With intent to evade any 
a. tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or 
b. requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or 
c. Any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission 
(3) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information 
within the time required by law; or 
(4) Made, rendered, signed or verified any false or fraudulent return or statement; 
or 
(5) Supplied any false or fraudulent information. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUil TY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00243 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 ---
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 5 with committing Tax Evasion on or 
about April 15, 2013. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the 
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted; 
(3) To evade or defeat; 
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; OR 
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00244 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ ---
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 6 with committing Failure to Render 
Tax Returns on or about April 15, 2013. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, 
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) With intent to evade any 
a. tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or 
b. requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or 
c. Any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission 
(3) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information 
within the time required by law; or 
(4) Made, rendered, signed or verified any false or fraudulent return or statement; 
or 
(5) Supplied any false or fraudulent information. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUil TY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00245 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 7 with committing Tax Evasion on or 
about April 15, 2014. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the 
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted; 
(3) To evade or defeat; 
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; OR 
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00246 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 8 with committing Failure to Render 
Tax Returns on or about April 15, 2014. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, 
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) With intent to evade any 
a. tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or 
b. requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or 
c. Any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission 
(3) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information 
within the time required by law; or 
(4) Made, rendered, signed or verified any false or fraudulent return or statement; 
or 
(5) Supplied any false or fraudulent information. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUil TY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00247 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 ---
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 9 with committing Tax Evasion on or 
about April 15, 2015. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the 
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted; 
(3) To evade or defeat; 
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or 
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUil TY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00248 
INSTRUCTION NO. / D 
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 10 with committing Failure to Render 
Tax Returns on or about April 15, 2015. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, 
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) With respect to a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401 
(3) Knowingly and intentionally, without a reasonable good faith basis; 
(4) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return; 
(5) Within the time required by law; or 
(6) Failed to supply information within the time required by law or 
(7) Made, rendered, signed, or verified any false or fraudulent return or 
statement; or 
(8) Supplied any false or fraudulent information. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUil TY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00249 
INSTRUCTION NO. I l 
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 11 with committing Tax Evasion on or 
about April 15, 2016. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the 
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
( 1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) Intentionally or willfully attempted; 
(3) To evade or defeat; 
(4) Any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or 
(5) The payment of a tax fee or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUil TY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00250 
INSTRUCTION NO. l-Z ---
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN is charged in Count 12 with committing Failure to Render 
Tax Returns on or about April 15, 2016. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, 
based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements: 
(1) Scott Alan Rasmussen; 
(2) With respect to a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401 
(3) Knowingly and intentionally, without a reasonable good faith basis; 
(4) Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return; 
(5) Within the time required by law; or 
(6) Failed to supply information within the time required by law or 
(7) Made, rendered, signed, or verified any false or fraudulent return or 
statement; or 
(8) Supplied any false or fraudulent information. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each 
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUil TY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every 
element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY. 
00251 
INSTRUCTION NO._) 3_ 
Before you can convict the defendant of Tax Evasion, as charged in Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 
and 11 of the Information, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
acted "intentionally" or "willfully." These are specifically defined terms that have the 
following meanings under the laws of the State of Utah: 
"Intentionally" or "willfully": a person engages in conduct intentionally, or with 
intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his 
conduct when it is his or her conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
00252 
INSTRUCTION NO. _a 
"Evade" is defined as avoidance of something by effort, skill, dexterity, 
contrivance, subterfuge, ingenuity, or artifice. In order to prove that Mr. Rasmussen had 
an intent to evade, the State must prove a conscious desire to avoid a legal requirement 
with which the actor knows he or she is obligated to comply. 
00253 
INSTRUCTION NO. { 5 
Every resident individual is required to file a state tax return in any year they are 
required to file a federal return. And a federal return must be filed whenever certain 
income thresholds are met-a tax does not necessarily need to be owed. Accordingly, 
Title 59 also requires residents to file income tax returns whenever these same income 
thresholds are met. Utah tax returns must be filed on or before April 15 or on or before 
the federal filing date. 
The filing thresholds for the relevant years are as follows: 
2010 - $9,350 
2011 - $9,500 
2012 - $9,750 
2013 - $10,000 
2014 - $10,150 
2015 - 10,300 
00254 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Resident individual" of the State of Utah means: 
(A) an individual who is domiciled in this state (Utah) for any period of time 
during the taxable year, but only for the duration of the period during which the 
individual is domiciled in this state; or 
(B) an individual who is not domiciled in this state but: 
(I) maintains a permanent place of abode in this state; and 
(II) spends in the aggregate 183 or more days of the taxable year in this 
state. 
(ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1 )(q)(i)(B), a fraction of a 
calendar day shall be counted as a whole day. 
00255 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
With respect to the offense of Tax Evasion, as charged in Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 
and 11 of the Information, the State must prove as an element of the offense that the 
defendant owed state income tax for the period alleged. 
00256 
INSTRUCTION NO. l s 
"Taxable income" or "state taxable income" for a resident individual, means the resident 
individual's adjusted gross income after making the additions, and subtractions, and 
adjustments required by Title 59. However, if an individual fails to file tax returns, 
unclaimed deductions are completely unavailable to him or her. 
00257 
INSTRUCTION NO. l 9 ---'--
Unless a resident individual is exempt, a tax is imposed on the state taxable income of a 
resident individual equal to 5% of the resident individual's state taxable income for that 
taxable year. 
00258 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1.0 
An individual is exempt from a tax imposed by Utah Code, Title 59, if the individual's 
adjusted gross income on the individual's federal individual income tax return for the 
taxable year is less than or equal to the sum of the individual's: 
a. personal exemptions for the taxable year; and 
b. standard deduction for that taxable year 
"Personal exemptions" means the total exemption amount an individual is allowed to 
claim for the taxable year under Section 151, Internal Revenue Code. 
"Standard deduction" means the standard deduction an individual is allowed to claim for 
the taxable year under Section 63, Internal Revenue Code. 
Personal Exemptions for the relevant years were as follows: 
2010 - $2,738 
2011 - $2,775 
2012 - $2,850 
2013 - $2,925 
2014 - $2,962.50 
2015 - $3,000 
Standard deductions for the relevant years were as follows: 
2010 - $5,700 
2011 - $5,800 
2012 - $5,950 
2013 - $6,100 
2014 - $6,200 
2015 - $6,300 
00259 
INSTRUCTION NO. t-\ 
The defendant's state of mind with regard to the alleged conduct may be inferred 
from the defendant's actions or from the surrounding circumstances. Reasonable 
inferences regarding the defendant's intent, willfulness, knowledge, or recklessness, or 
lack thereof, may be drawn from the surrounding facts. 
00260 
INSTRUCTION NO. L 2-
With respect to Counts 2, 4, 6 and 8, Failure to Render Tax Returns, the State must 
prove that it was the defendant's conscious desire to evade any 
a. tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401; or 
b. requirement of Title 59, revenue and taxation; or 
c. any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission 
An intent not to file a tax return, even if required by law to file, is an "intent to 
evade" only if the actor is aware that he or she is legally required to file. 
00261 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 3 
Before you can convict the defendant of Failure to Render a Tax Return, as charged in 
Counts 10 and 12 of the Information, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted "knowingly" and "intentionally." These are specifically defined terms 
that have the following meanings under the laws of the State of Utah: 
(1) "Intentionally": a person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct 
when it is his or her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) "Knowingly": a person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his or her conduct or to circumstances surrounding his or her 
conduct when he or she is aware of the nature of his or her conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to a result of his or her conduct when he or she is aware that his or 
her conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
00262 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ ~ 
If a person required to file a return with the Utah State Tax Commission fails to 
file the return with the Commission, the Commission may estimate the tax, fee, or 
charge due from the best information or knowledge the Commission can obtain. 
00263 
INSTRUCTION NO. L-? 
Gross income is all income from whatever sources. 
00264 
INSTRUCTION NO. L (o 
Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense 
to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct 
did not constitute an offense; and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or 
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law 
with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a 
court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question. 
00265 
INSTRUCTION NO. L-/ 
A person acts "intentionally," "willfully," or "with intent" when his or her conscious 
objective is to engage in certain conduct. Conduct means either an act or an omission. 
00266 
